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REVIEWS 
Rousseau and Kant) that have informed liberal politics, and the other, 
if not greater, darkness, in the form of religiously inspired violence, 
. against which liberalism has also historically struggled. In slighting 
that nobler, if partly mistaken, motive, Tuck's otherwise incisive study 
fails to do liberalism full justice. 
SUSAN M. SHELL 
Boston College 
Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant. By Sharon Anderson-Gold. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 200 I. Pp. xiii, 138. ISBN 0-7914-4819-3 (hbk) $50.50; 
0-7914-4820-7 (pbk) $17.95. 
This slim volume offers a very valuable contribution to the ongoing 
explication and reconstruction of Kant's ethics as a social ethics. 
Anderson-Gold shares the increasingly common Kant reading that his 
notion of the highest good as the universal union of virtue and 
happiness is to b~ understood as a social ideal that sets 'collective 
moral goals'. This reading sees Kant's writings on history as integral 
to his moral theory in that one must assess how much, and in what 
way, progress has been made toward realizing the ideal in order to 
articulate specific social duties. Anderson-Gold discusses in several 
chapters Kant's view of historical progress and the reflective 
judgement that enables us to articulate and assess such progress. She 
pays special attention to his idea that the enthusiasm that the French 
Revolution engendered among its spectators shows that a moral 
cause, or a genuine concern with universal welfare, is operative in 
humanity. Her analysis of this public of spectators leads to an 
interesting discussion of emerging pluralistic 'cosmopolitan publics' 
in our own time as a precondition for future peace, jlfstice and local 
and global democracy. In the final chapter of her book, Anderson-
Gold further articulates contemporary Kantian social:' duties, 
supplementing her political-legal and cosmopolitan public proposals 
with Kantian arguments for sustainable economic development. The 
core of her work, however, is to argue that Kant's much neglected 
doctrine of radical evil is crucial to his social ethics, both as a matter 
of textual accuracy and in 1;erms of its contemporary reconstruction. 
This argument will be the focus of the remainder of this review. 
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Anderson-Gold maintains that, even though an increasing number 
of contemporary Kant scholars, such as Yirmiahu Yovel and more 
recently Pauline Kleingeld, have correctly interpreted the highest good 
as a social and historical ideal, 'none hav~ provided an adequate 
explanation of how such a goal is related to the moral life of 
individuals' (p. 6). Notably, they have not offered an account of 'how 
it is that individuals have a personal stake in the promotion of this 
ideal' (p. 7). The doctrine of radical evil provides such an account 
once it is recognized that the propensity to evil that Kant ascribed to 
humanity emerges only in a social context. Anderson-Gold cites 
Kant's claim in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (tr. T. M. 
Greene and H. H. Hudson, p. 85) that 
envy, the lust for power, greed, and the malignant inclinations bound up 
with these, besiege [the individual's] nature, contented within itself, as 
soon as he is among men, and it is not even necessary to assume that these 
are men sunk in evil and examples to lead him astray. (Ak. 6: 93-4) 
She clarifies: 'The propensity to evil is not something that is simply 
'within me' and 'within you', but something that operates within our 
very mode of association' (p. 46). This means that 'Kant implies that 
our hope to effect a revolution "within" [the overcoming of evil and 
the striving for moral perfection] rests upon the transformation of the 
social condition of our existence'. Anderson-Gold adds that striving 
for virtue viewed as a private enterprise is 'futile' (p. 46), citing with 
approval Kant's view that we must leave the 'ethical state of nature' 
and unite in ethical communities for the sake of collectively 
combating evil, for without such communities individuals, no matter 
how much they 'may have done to throw off tIie sovereignty of evil', 
are 'incessantly in danger of falling back under its dominion' 
(Religion, p. 86). The highest good as social ideal and the moral life of 
the individual, then, are intrinsically connected. Individual moral 
progress requires collective moral improvement, and the individual 
striving for moral perfection requires that one joins and actively 
participates in voluntary associations of virtue that aim at the highest 
good. 
Anderson-Gold rightly holds that Kant's thesis of the innate 
propensity to evil as it relates to the highest good has received 
inadequate attention and her work' admirably fills the gap. Still, this 
leaves the question open whether a further development of Kant's 
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 6,2002 137 
REVIEWS 
social ethics (as is Anderson-Gold's aim) should proceed along these 
lines. One problem is that Kant only mentions churches as imperfect 
examples of ethical communities and that he emphasized that full 
moral emancipation requires that religious institutions are eventually 
cast aside and replaced by a 'church invisible' or 'inner' unification of 
good wills. Thus the struggle for moral perfection falls back from a 
collective undertaking to an individual one. Anderson-Gold needs to 
address systematically why Kant took this step. Another difficulty is 
that the focus on innate evil may not be compatible with the view of 
the highest good as a universal task. Anderson-Gold maintains that 
moral commitment to the ethical community and its aims requires 
moral faith, a faith in 'God as Absolute Person, through whose 
continuous presence the moral law abides while our commitments 
waver' (p. 51). I am not sure what to make of this statement and doubt 
that it fits with Kant's overall view. Does Anderson-Gold want to say 
that those who do not believe in such a Being are doomed to fail in 
their endeavour to live a socially committed and righteous life? At any 
rate, Anderson-Gold's claim seems incompatible with he~ attempt to 
show the contemporary relevance of Kant's social ethics by arguing 
that 'voluntary associations formed [in our time] to promote the basic 
interests and rights of world citizens are social instantiations of 
ethical communities', and that 'ethical communities need not be 
limited to communities of religious faith, although they often do in 
fact arise from such communities' (p. 108). Her commitment to a 
clearly Christian conception of evil is in tension with her defence of 
pluralism. A final problem is that Kant held that good legal 
conditions are necessary for the emergence of the highest, good as 
social ideal, but that legal institutions themselves are not a locus of 
moral emancipation. The view of moral development as the 
overcoming of evil seems to strengthen this institutional bias that is 
antithetical to directly grounding social duties. 
The upshot is that a convincing Kantian social ethics may need to 
break more fundamentally with Kant than Anderson-Gold envisions. 
More importantly, it may be that for the purpose of bringing Kant's 
ethics to a higher social plane it would be better to develop further his 
notions of autonomy and heteronomy as individual and social 
concepts than to do the same for his ideas of innate evil and striving 
for moral perfection. 
The title of Anderson-Gpld's work indicates that her vision of 
moral progress and the huma~ predicament is far from optimistic. No 
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doubt, we are the beneficiaries of the toil of previous generations, but 
our gain comes with a definite price. Anderson-Gold perceptively 
notes: 
The moral life of later generations is in some respects more challenging 
than the moral life of earlier generations. As the scope and complexity of 
institutional life grows, the need for an educated and enlightened public 
increases. When social-cultural opportunities for such enlightenment are 
present, the individual has a stronger duty to participate and maintain 
these conditions for future generations. (p. 102) 
She concludes her book in the same vein: 'Moral life will become 
increasingly challenging' (p. 110). Anderson~Gold's study offers a 
worthy avenue for helping us to meet this challenge. 
HARRY VAN DER LINDEN 
Butler University 
Kants Ethik: Die Grundlehre. By Peter Baumanns. WLirzburg: Konigshausen 
und Neumann, 2000. Pp. 120. ISBN 3-8260-1931-8, DM 28. 
Beginners in philosophy very often find Kant's works hard to read. 
They appear difficult to them not only because his philosophy is as 
complex and difficult as it is, but also because Kant does not present 
his theories in a reader-friendly way. He uses long, complex sentences, 
misleading examples, yet he is enigmatic and brief where he should be 
clear and detailed (and vice versa), dry and practically without jokes 
(though his tone is sometimes ironical and mocking). It is hard stuff, 
and not only for beginners. 
It is all the more important that a commentator should make 
Kant's texts and his arguments readable and understandable. 
Naturally, this is particularly true for all those who write 
introductions and overviews and who address beginners. Peter' 
Baumann's small book on Kants Ethik is meant to be such a book for 
beginners. It goes back to a course given at the University of Hagen 
(where students work at home, not in real classes), but since theil it 
has been entirely revised. Baumanns intends a 'Heranfiihrung' (p. 7), 
an 'Orientierung' (S.7) which presents the 'Grundlehre' (the book's 
subtitle) of Kant's ethics. 
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